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Abstract –  We suggest a technology and set of procedures by which a major 
democratic deﬁcit of modern society can be addressed. The mechanism, whilst it  
makes limited use of cryptographic techniques in the background, is based 
around objects and procedures with which voters are currently familiar. We 
believe that systems like this hold considerable potential for the extension of  
democratic participation and control.
1.  – Introduction
Current political systems tend to have a very limited degree of democracy. Such control as the 
people have over public policy is indirect — mainly taking the form of periodic elections of 
popular representatives to the parliament. This form of indirect representation contrasts with 
the direct democracy that operated in ancient Greece where the entire citizen body would 
gather in the town square to debate and vote on issues which affected them [1, 2]. The ancient 
states of Greece were little more than we would now call towns, and techniques that worked 
for a town became impossible in a modern nation state. A nation cannot physically gather its 
population into one place to deliberate on policy. 
At the time it was introduced, the right to vote for representatives in parliament was a big step 
forward.  It  was  clearly  better  than  having  a  parliament  in  which  MPs  were  essentially 
appointed by the local aristocracy, but, when compared with direct democracy it has inherent 
weaknesses. 
During the lifetime of a parliament, an MP, let us call here Ms Gray, will vote on perhaps 100 
different items of legislation. Even if we us suppose that the system that elected Ms Gray was 
fair, all this means is that a majority of her constituents preferred Ms Gray to her rivals Mr 
Red,  Ms Green,  and Mr Black.  It  does  not  follow that  each time Ms Gray votes  in  the 
Parliament, her vote will represent the wishes of a majority of her constituents. That would 
only occur if the population at large lined up neatly into political parties, with all Labour 
voters agreeing with every act brought forward by a Labour government, and all Tory voters 
agreeing with every act of their own government. It is quite possible that the parliament will 
enact laws with which a majority of the population disagree. 
On information theoretical grounds this is clearly deﬁcient. Suppose elections are held every 4 
years and that there are 8 candidates per seat. Each vote cast conveys Log2(8)=3 bits, giving a 
bandwidth from each constituency to the political decision making process of only ¾ bit per 
year.  But  if  an  MP will  make  25  yes/no  votes  per  annum,  there  is  thus  clearly  a  huge 
“impedance mismatch” in the channel. 
On  very  major  constitutional  issues,  national  referenda  or  plebiscites  are  held.  Their 
infrequency stems both from their complexity and expense, and also from the reluctance of 
elected politicians to give up any of their power to the people they are supposed to represent. 
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Contrast this to what happens on TV. Every week there are reality TV shows, or competitions 
in which the viewers are asked phone in to decide which contestant is to win or loose. What 
makes them worth doing, from the TV companies’ point of view, is that they are able to 
charge viewers phone bill every time they vote. What has made them possible is the digital 
technology  which  allows  incoming  phone  calls  and  Short  Text  Messages  to  be  rapidly 
counted.  Commercial  interests  have  resulted  in  a  technology  being  developed,  which,  if 
applied in the ﬁeld of national politics, would give citizens real democratic control over the 
executive. 
Before the phone voting used on TV could be used in anything other than games, something 
would have to be done to make it not just efﬁcient, which it already is, but secure, which it 
certainly is not. In TV phone voting, there is nothing to stop you voting as often as you wish 
for the candidate of your choice, provided that you are willing to pay the charge. 
If  this were the only problem with phone voting, there would be an easy answer,  simply 
design the vote counting software so that it only counts a single vote from each phone, but 
this would not prevent somebody with both a land-line and a mobile phone from voting twice. 
If everyone trusted the state one solution would be for voters to register their phone number 
when they registered to vote. This would ensure one person one vote, but what if you feared 
the government? Would you not be afraid that they could now easily ﬁnd out how you had 
voted? Might that information affect the way the government dealt with you in the future? 
What is needed is a way of identifying each voter so that (s)he can only vote once, but at the 
same time preventing the government from discovering how (s)he voted.
2.  – E-Voting Requirements
Any vote must guarantee both voter anonymity and integrity of the process [3]. A paper based 
process satisﬁes these requirements but is expensive and somewhat error prone since it relies 
on humans counting votes. There has been a move to electronic voting in some countries. 
Evans and Paul cite a report by the Caltech/MIT Voting project [4] which claims that only 1% 
of the US population used a paper ballot in 2000. 
Unfortunately, whereas people have long experience with paper ballot,  and therefore trust 
them, electronic voting has had some bad press and therefore voters tend to be rather cynical 
about it. One wants to avoid, at all costs, the secrecy that has bedevilled electronic voting in 
the USA where it led to suspicion that the voting machine ﬁrms, who sympathise with the 
Republican party, could have rigged the results of elections. The trio goals of anonymity, 
auditability  and  integrity  encompass  a  number  of  requirements  of  e-voting  systems. 
Anonymity [5] — voters should not be linked to their vote in case this could be used against 
them at a later stage. Assurances from those in power may well not be sufﬁcient to reassure 
voters;  the  system  must  be  demonstrably  and  veriﬁably  anonymous;  Privacy  & 
Conﬁdentiality [6, 7, 8] — voters should be able to record their vote without other voters or 
ofﬁcials being able to observe them; Coercion resistance — the process should be resistant to 
coercion [5, 8]; Veriﬁability [5, 9, 7, 10] — this should be engendered by a transparent and 
open process which encourages voters to trust the system; Lowering of barriers [11] — there 
should be multiple ways for the voter to cast his or her vote, by means of various devices, so 
that both house-bound voters and travelling voters are accommodated, for example. 
We also have to satisfy traditional transactional requirements [6] including atomicity [12] — 
one person, one vote; integrity [11, 7] — the person’s vote must be recorded correctly and the 
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votes  must  be  counted  correctly;  durability — votes  should  not  be  discarded;  and  non-
interference  [12] — it  should not be possible for votes to be altered en-route to the vote 
storage system.
3.  – The Proposed Voting Mechanism
Figure 1: Voter Card
As  mentioned  in  the  previous  section,  voting  involves  three  distinct  stages:  registration, 
voting and veriﬁcation. These are the stages the voter is involved in, but in order for the 
process to meet our two requirements, we need also to regulate the preparatory process and 
the  required  infrastructure.  We  will  discuss  our  proposal  in  terms  of  how  it  will  be 
implemented in these stages.
3.1 – Preparation
Voter cards will be produced for every voter in the country. This looks like a credit card with 
an embedded chip in it and a voter number printed on it. The voter number on each card is 
unique, and imprinted on the chip. There is also a PIN printed on the card, which may be 
needed for some input devices. Furthermore, on the back of the card, three telephone numbers 
are printed: A “Yes” number and a “No” number. (These are to facilitate SMS voting. These 
numbers will also be advertised by radio, television and newspaper in the run up to the 
plebiscite) A free help number is printed on the back of the card so that voters can have their 
votes voided if they voted in error or if they were coerced
3.2 – Registration
We would suggest that there be a ﬁxed period during which people have to register to vote. 
This might for example be at 3 year intervals. We envisage that there would be multiple 
plebiscites between registration periods. Registration would happen as follows: 
1. When you register, you present your identiﬁcation, which is copied and then returned to 
you. Your name is ticked on the list of electors. 
2. You then pick one of a number of sealed envelopes from a jar and thus receive one 
voter’s card in the sealed envelope. Most importantly for anonymity, the electoral ofﬁcials 
cannot match the card number to the voter. 
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3. At the registration ofﬁce a machine will be made available for voters to specify their 
voting preferences. For example, if the voter is concerned about being coerced, she/he could 
insert the card into the machine and tailor it so that the vote can only be case from a polling 
booth. 
4. Finally, at the end of the registration period election ofﬁcials must enter the numbers of 
all remaining cards into the system so that no one can “steal” the votes associated with these 
cards. 
5. On the registration closing date, a list of all the valid numbers will be recorded at an 
independent website called the “Validation Centre”, with an associated web service. This will 
be used for veriﬁcation purposes once the votes are counted.
3.3 – Voting
Since one of the requirements of effective e-voting is the lowering of barriers, there should be 
a number of ways the voter can choose to register his/her vote: 
• At the polls — the voter enters the booth, inserts his or her card into the slot and 
chooses yes or no. In order to accommodate illiterate users votes should be entered by 
means of a touch sensitive screen where options are clearly shown both textually and 
by means of icons. 
• Via their ATM machine — the voter inserts the card into their bank’s ATM machine 
and registers their vote by choosing the option on the screen. The bank uses a secure 
channel to send the vote to the central voting system. 
• Via public telephone kiosks — the voter enters the card into the slot below the phone. 
This causes an automatic and free call to be placed to the voting system and the user 
can then register the YES or NO vote either verbally or by choosing an option from 
the keypad as prompted. We suggest that the call is automatically placed to eliminate 
errors in entering the free phone numbers, which will be hidden since the card has 
been inserted into the kiosk. It is far simpler for a person register a Yes or No choice 
than to enter a 10 digit number. 
• Via SMS — the voter sends an SMS message to the applicable number (Yes or No) 
with simply the voter card number embedded in the message. The system will request 
the PIN by SMS and the voter replies with an SMS with the PIN in it. 
• Via a phone, either mobile or ﬁxed link — the voter dials the advertised number and 
reads or  keys in  their  voter  number  as  prompted by the system. The system then 
requests the PIN and the user reads the PIN into the receiver. 
The latter two (phone) options are the only ones where the voter identity can be discovered if 
the system records the caller identity. The voter card will carry instructions to the voter to 
hide their caller identity if this option is used. Furthermore, in order to prevent people sending 
votes in by simply guessing other people’s voter numbers, the voters using phone ballots will 
be required to give the matching PIN when they submit their vote via SMS or land line. This 
proves that they actually possess the card. 
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Note that the use of a PIN plus a voter number is in security terms equivalent to having just a 
longer  number.  Splitting  it  into  two  portions  has  advantages  from the  point  of  view of 
usability  and reliability  though because errors  can be made keying in  a  number,  and the 
probability of making a mistake is higher with one long number than two short numbers as we 
are  better  equipped  to  visually  identify  errors  in  short  numbers  than  long  numbers. 
Furthermore, people are familiar with PIN numbers and credit card security codes which carry 
out the same basic function.  
3.4 – Verification
In order to prevent fraud in the counting process, the electoral commission will publish, on its 
website and on a specially designated TV channel, all the yes voter numbers and all the no 
voter numbers. If a voter wishes to check that her vote was correctly registered, and she has a 
computer with Internet access, she downloads the ﬁle onto her computer and uses an editor 
program to search for her number in either the YES ﬁle or the NO ﬁle. Alternatively, she 
tunes her TV to the designated channel and waits until her number comes up and checks that 
the vote recorded against that number is correct. 
Publication of this list of votes allows independent veriﬁcation of the count of votes cast for 
each proposition. This avoids the secrecy that has bedevilled electronic voting in the USA 
where it leads to suspicion that the voting machine ﬁrms, who sympathise with the 
Republican party, could have rigged the results of elections.
3.5 – Infrastructure
There  is  one  major  system involved  in  recording  the  votes  and  performing the  counting 
process once the plebiscite is over. The system needs to be secured very carefully and all 
accesses to the system need to be made via a Virtual Private Network (VPN) connection. 
Therefore we will have a specialised system that interfaces with each of the input devices. 
The  connection  to  each  of  these  will  occur  via  recognised  channels  and  based  on  the 
requirements of the input device. These systems will communicate, via VPN, with the voter 
registration system. There will also be two specialised output handling systems to send the 
lists of voter numbers and choices to a website and TV channel. The communication with 
these systems will also be via VPN. All support and IT staff have to be very carefully vetted 
to ensure that they are above reproach.
3.6 – Audit
Once all voting has been completed, an audit process will verify that the votes have indeed 
been counted correctly. It should be possible to identify any insider interference at this stage 
and to narrow down the culprit in the case of fraudulent activity being uncovered.  
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4  Threats
It should be noted that in a system of plebiscites there is less at stake in each vote than there is 
in elections. In elections one has to face the risk of organised fraud perpetrated by political 
parties or politicians who have a lot to win or loose. In an individual plebiscite special interest 
groups may attempt to inﬂuence the vote, but such groups formed to ﬁght one issue are less 
likely to have the nation-wide network of organised supporters that a political party has. The 
exception might be if a plebiscite was called that threatened the interests of some large 
business group — tobacco companies for example in the case of a proposal to ban smoking. 
Such organisations might make up in wealth what they lacked in terms of mass membership 
and still pose a danger to the procedures. But since such circumstances will be exceptional, 
the level of security need not be as high as for electronic elections. 
Suppose we have a voting population of 100million. Except in very tightly fought issues, one 
would probably have to cast several million false votes to have a chance of changing the 
outcome of a vote. One has to provide sufﬁcient safeguards to ensure that it is unlikely that 
fraud on this scale could go undetected. 
Here are some threats to the process that need to be considered: 
Preparation 
Insider: Someone working at the manufacturing site may well record the numbers on some of 
the cards. If the card is issued to a voter and the insider has abused his knowledge to “steal” 
the person’s vote, the legitimate card holder will detect this as soon as he tries to vote and he 
will be able to contact the help number to void the vote already cast. If this occurs there are 
two options — either void the card number altogether and issue the voter with a new card, or 
simply void the vote and allow the voter to place his vote. The former is probably more secure 
but infeasible. 
Outsider: Someone could bombard the system with 10 digit numbers in the hopes of being 
able to guess a valid voter card number. This is an inherent weakness of the phone-in input 
devices which we include to lower barriers to voting. The use of a separate PIN alleviates this 
threat to a certain extent since we could “lock” the card if the voter makes a number of errors 
with the PIN entry and require the legitimate voter to report to a polling station to correct the 
error. 
Registration
Insider: One of the election ofﬁcers could theoretically steal a card, but this is prevented by 
requiring a copy of the voter’s identiﬁcation document to be made for each card issued. 
Outsider: Someone could attempt to register by using a fake identity document. This threat is 
common to all voting mechanisms and cannot be alleviated by our proposal. 
Voting (Outsider) 
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It is possible for someone to coerce the voter and to vote on his behalf. We have built two 
safeguards into the system to alleviate this: 
• The voter can contact the authorities and have the vote voided 
• The voter can, at registration, request that the vote only be accepted from a polling 
booth where she can be protected from coercive activities. 
• A voter card may be stolen and used by the thief to place a vote they are not entitled 
to. Since the card is not linked to the voter there is no way for the system to void such 
votes unless the user has recorded both the voter card number and the PIN and is able 
to give the electoral ofﬁcer this information. Even if a voter proffers such information 
one has no way of knowing whether this is a valid complaint or an attempt to void 
someone else’s vote. 
• Brute force: someone could write code to ﬂood the system with guessed voter card 
numbers to register false votes. This will not work unless they can guess the matching 
PIN and the chances of this happening are 1 in 10000 for a 4 digit PIN. 
Veriﬁcation (Outsider) — Someone could hack into the website and insert ﬁctitious numbers 
into the ﬁles. This could be alleviated by having updating this list at regular intervals from the 
vote recording site. 
Figure 1: Voting Infrastructure
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Environment (Insider) 
• Someone could insert a vote into the system using a legitimate voter number. This is 
alleviated by means of the continuously updated veriﬁcation lists and the ability to 
void votes, upon request. 
• Somebody could fraudulently add voter card numbers and PINs to the list which 
corresponded either to cards which were never handed out, or to cards which never 
existed. With the use of these numbers they could then make fraudulent votes. 
In order to guard against fraudulent insiders of the latter type we propose the following 
procedures: 
• When voting cards are manufactured, 4 plain text copies of the list of valid cards are 
made: one on paper and three on some archival machine readable medium. The paper 
copy and one machine readable copy are sealed and placed in a secure bank vault 
under the view of witnesses. It is important that only a small number of known 
individuals participate in this process. 
• The machine readable copies are then transferred to a Validation Centre where an 
encrypted copy is made and placed on a secure server. One copy is a backup in case of 
media errors. Having been encrypted the plain text archival media are then publicly 
destroyed. It is important that only a small number of known individuals participate in 
this process. 
• Electoral registration ofﬁcers return plain-text copies of the list of unused voter cards 
to the validation ofﬁce and also publish these lists of unused voter cards. 
• The vote counting computers are run by an organisation distinct from the Validation 
Centre. When votes occur, voter numbers that have been phoned in are checked, over a 
secure channel, with the Validation Centre, after having ﬁrst been checked against the 
published list of unused voter cards. The Validation Centre returns a yes/no for each 
query. 
Audit 
At the end of the 3 year registration period, the sealed copies of the original list of cards are 
opened and the list of cards that were originally valid is published. Since all votes cast have 
also been published, it is possible for any private organisation with modest computing 
facilities to check if any of the published votes cast in the last 3 years were by cards that had 
not been validly issued. In the case of a discrepancy the suspicion would fall on a small group 
of known individuals. The near certainty of malfeasance detection should be an incentive 
adequate to ensure honesty in this group.
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5  Comparison with other proposals
Most  other  proposals  for  electronic  voting  are  concerned  with  elections  rather  than 
plebiscites.  As  we  have  argued,  the  former  require  higher  levels  of  security.  Another 
important factor is that in a system of participatory democracy voting will be more frequent 
and must therefore be more accessible.  Our proposal has something in common with the 
proposals of Storer and Duncan [8, 10]. Like their system, it allows voting by telephone. We 
consider this to be an important factor because mobile phones are available to a larger portion 
of  the  population  than  computers,  especially  in  poorer  countries.  We  thus  rule  out  of 
consideration any procedure that requires voters to have access to personal programmable 
computing devices. It has to be possible to use simple telephony. 
The  differences  between  the  systems  are  that  whereas  Storer  and  Duncan’s  system also 
involves the use of personal voting cards with unique numbers on them, their system has three 
numbers:  the  voter  ID  number,  the  Personal  Candidate  ID  Number  used  to  vote  for  a 
candidate, and a Receipt ID, which is sent back to conﬁrm the vote. Veriﬁcation by voters is 
easier in our system since the voter merely has to look for his or her voter number on the YES 
and NO lists published after the count. In Storer and Duncan’s system the voter veriﬁes by 
matching  the  candidate  name  and  RCID  tuple  on  the  list,  which  is  harder  and  more 
demanding. Most importantly, our system allows and facilitates complete anonymity. 
In Storer and Duncan’s system, the State posts cards to voters and thus can match the voter to 
the voter number. They propose a complicated system of subdivision of agencies issuing the 
numbers  to  protect  anonymity,  but  the  voter  still  has  to  take  it  on  trust  that  these  State 
Agencies are not colluding. In our system the voters can be sure that nobody else knows what 
their voter number is. This is ensured by the readily understandable process of drawing a card 
from a pile rather than an incomprehensible and opaque electronic or bureaucratic procedure. 
Their system is not secure against the insertion of fraudulent votes in the event of collusion 
between the various State Agencies administering it. Because we have completely anonymous 
voter numbers, we can allow a fully public audit of the voting results that would detect such 
fraud.
6  Conclusion
Our aim has been to suggest a technology and set of procedures by which a major democratic 
deﬁcit of modern society [13, 14] can be addressed. E-voting is in the news regularly, and 
many articles claim that anonymity and auditability cannot co-exist [15]. 
In this paper we suggest a mechanism which, whilst it makes limited use of cryptographic 
techniques in the background, is based around objects and procedures with which voters are 
currently  familiar  and  which  does  provide  an  environment  for  happy  co-existence  of 
anonymity and auditability. 
We believe that systems like this hold considerable potential for the extension of democratic 
participation and control.
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